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ABSTRACT 
While there is much discussion of the impact of land use con-
trols, economic research on their effects has lagged. This study 
examines the economic rationale of such controls from the perspective 
of economic theory and notes that only have theorists be-
gun to develop and test models of land and markets explicitly 
incorporating zoning and other land use controls. 
A summary of the econometric research reveals mixed results 
concerning the impact of zoning upon property values. Some studies 
indicate that zoning has raised property values, while others claim 
that it has resulted in a random pattern; these mixed results are 
usually attributed to improper model specification. Studies on the 
cost impact of building codes have also disparate con-
clusions, some claiming a weak co effect and others a 
substantial one. Variations among the markets and building codes 
of different jurisdictions are citied as reasons for the variation 
in findings. 
However, even t this of inconclusive 
research on the land use controls instituted by the California 
Coastal Zone Conservation Commission is poor. The studies conducted 
to date generally lack the theoretical underpinning, methodological 
sophistication, and quality of data base which characterize other 
economic studies of land use controls. Many of these studies were 
intended as preliminary assessments aimed at identifying impacts 
and providing rough initial estimates upon which to base policy 
decisions. And while most of these descriptive or analytical 
studies do not violate economic theory, they are not sophisticated 
in their application of it. The empirical studies of the coastal 
commission do not, with one exception, utilize statistical tests 
of inference. Interestingly, the sole statistical test performed 
yielded counter-intuitive results. Furthermore, the data used in 
the empirical studies is typically much too aggregated to identify 
and ascribe effects to the coastal commission alone. 
The poor quality of existing research argues for new studies 
of better research design which will utilize economic models, 
statistical tests, and a suitably disaggregated data base. Several 
specific proposals of this type for research on various aspects of 
the coastal commission's impact are provided in order to stimulate 
further study. 
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ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LAND USE CONTROL: 
THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION 
1< 
Robert Kneisel 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Increasing demands on limited coastal resources for commercial, residential, 
and recreational uses, combined with the "externality" and "public good" nature 
of these resources, have led to problems in their allocation by the market. 
Economists, with their traditio1~l concern over allocative efficiency, have 
recently become interested in overcoming these problems through appropriate 
government regulation of land use.l From a different perspective, the equity 
effects of both market and regulated means of coastal resource allocation have 
also become an important issue. 
Coastal zone management is the term applied to governmental planning and 
regulation of land uses along the coast. Though a few--mostly metropolitan--
sections of coast have historically been subject to land use control in the form 
of municipal zoning, controls have only recently expanded to include entire 
stretches of coast. Coastal zone management includes not only the implementation 
of coastal land use controls but encompasses a diversity of fields such as land 
use planning, environmental impact assessment, public finance, and other con-
cerns necessary for sound regulation of land use on the coast. 
Coastal zone management is a prime example of the "Quiet Revolution" in 
land use controls.2 The Quiet Revolution describes the recent shift in decision-
making authority over the uses of land from municipalities to state and regional 
agencies. A major cause of the shift has been the inability or unwillingness 
of the numerous separate municipalities to provide an integrated, rational, and 
externality-minimizing system of regionwide land use controls, especially in 
critical areas such as the coastal zone. 
Coastal zone management has quite rapidly become an important issue at the 
state, local, and national levels. In passing the Coastal Zone Management Act 
of 1972, Congress recognized the timeliness of such management. And the voters 
of California, in particular, felt strongly enough about public management of 
land use on the coast to approve Proposition 20 by a 55 percent majority (Deacon 
and Shapiro, 1975). 
Despite the importance of the coastal zone management issue, scant research 
has been undertaken to date to determine the economic consequences of various 
coastal zone management approaches (as distinguished from the economics of land 
use controls in general, as discussed in Chapter III). The literature that 
exists is mostly descriptive rather than analytical and qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Especially lacking are empirical studies of the economic impact 
.D. candidate, Department of Economics, UC Riverside. 
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of coastal zone management programs.3 These deficiencies have meant that de-
cisions by coastal zone policymakers and implementers have often been made in 
the absence of any precise or systematic knowledge about the results of those 
decisions. A great deal of additional detailed and comprehensive information is 
clearly needed. It is hoped that the present report will provide background and 
direction for such research. 
This study begins with a general discussion of the economic theory of land 
use controls--their rationale, benefits, and costs. This is followed by a survey 
of recent empirical research in the general area of the economic impact of land 
use controls. This "state of the art" review then serves as a baseline for dis-
cussing the growing number of economic studies of the coastal zone management 
programs of California's Coastal Zone Conservation Commission and the regional 
commissions established by Proposition 20. It will be seen that research on 
the economic impact of the commissions lacks the methodological sophistication 
of the general research on land use controls. 
Deficiencies in existing research can serve as a guide to the design of 
future studies; Chapter V describes a number of feasible research projects on 
issues posed by coastal land use controls, along with an explanation of how these 
studies can complement and extend existing research. 
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II 
ECONOMICS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 
A. Rationale for Land Use Controls 
A large and well-known literature exists on the topics discussed below--ex-
ternalities, public goods, option values, etc., so that only a brief summary of 
major conclusions which pertain to the economics of land use controls is pre-
sented here. References to sources for further elaboration on these basic 
topics appear in the Notes at the end of this study. Representative research 
on these issues as they relate to land use controls are treated in Chapter III. 
1. Reducing Externalities - The traditional rationale for zoning is that 
it spatially separates incompatible land uses, such as residences and industry.4 
Land uses are incompatible when they impose "negative externalities"--unintended 
damaging side effects--upon neighboring uses. For example, multi-family apart-
ments are said to be incompatible with single-family residences because they 
supposedly draw into the neighborhood families characterized by lower socio-
economic status, less concern for the neighborhood, and greater transience. The 
extent of this negative externality is measured by the (hypothesized) lower prop-
erty values in neighborhoods containing multi-family apartments.5 
The unregulated market is often unable to minimize these negative exter-
nalities. This may be because the number of disadvantaged parties is large, 
making bargaining (to reduce or remove the externality) between them and the 
responsible party an unwieldy affair. Or the cost of arranging a suitable 
solution between even a few parties may be prohibitive.6 
When the market mechanism cannot provide a solution to the externality prob-
lem, a government agency may provide one of the following types of regulation: 
(1) prevent the externality or externality-causing activity outright; (2) prevent 
the activity from generating an externality by separating incompatible uses 
through land use controls; or (3) force the party responsible for the external-
ity to compensate the injured party by an amount equal to the damage. When 
negative externalities are reduced or eliminated by these means, the general 
economic welfare is increased. 
2. Providing Public Goods - A public good is defined as a good for which 
the condition obtains that one person's consumption of it is not diminished by 
another person's consumption of it. Scenic beauty, open space, and fire pro-
tection are examples. In the private market, individuals have little incentive 
to make expenditures for public goods because of the "free rider" effect. That 
is, once an individual purchases a certain amount of a public good, other con-
sumers can oy it free of This stems primarily from the fact that 
other consumers cannot be excluded from oying a public good once it is pro-
vided for any consumer.7 
Land use controls are one means of providing a suitable level of public 
goods. For , a municipal height limitation can benefit all viewers. 
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Yet, without such a set limitation, it is unlikely 
individuals would value their own viewing 
tarily for the reduction of obtrusive structures or signs. 
that separate 
to pay volun-
3. Providing Environmental Quality and Protection of the Environment - The 
private market's failure to ensure acceptable levels of environmental quality is 
a result both of the public-good nature of the environment and of environmental 
externalities in production and consumption. Unhindered land development may 
generate environmental costs which are not charged against the developer, but 
instead are incurred by the community as a whole. Community land use agencies 
therefore regulate environmentally destructive activities of private developers 
in the name of their constituency. However, environmental effects are often 
so widespread and pervasive that local governments are unable to regulate them 
adequately. This is the rationale behind the of local zoning 
authority regional and statewide land use control Such supra-local 
land use controls are especially in "critical areas" such as swamp-
lands or coastal zones, where benefits of preservation accrue to a popu-
lace than the immediate community (Bosselman and Callies, 1971). 
4. Establishing, Preserving, and Enhancing an Economic Base - Communities 
usually act so as to preserve their tax base. One means of doing this is to 
reduce or eliminate, by zoning, uses which cause the community a net fiscal 
liability and to increase those uses which a net fiscal This is 
known as fiscal zoning (Sagalyn and Sternlieb, 1972:3-4). "Bedroom" communities 
may exclude industry in order to preserve the character of their community and 
hence the residential property tax base. Other communities may seek to attract 
industry for the tax base it provides, but it by zoning so that negative 
externalities are not inflicted upon the community.8 
The resul "menu" of taxes and tax-financed public services 
across communities allows potential residents to "shop" among communities for 
the most preferred combination. (This is known as the Tiebout-Oates Hypothesis 
[Oates, 1969].) Thus zoning decisions, by determining the pattern of taxes and 
revenues, also largely determine the income and class character of the community. 
5. Preserving Option Value - Economists have come to realize that there is 
value in preserving resources in an idle state, even if their present use or 
exploitation is profitable. Since land usually precludes alternative 
uses for the foreseeable future, options are effectively eliminated. The in-
ability of the market to include completely the values which future generations 
may place on land provides a rationale for land use controls which preserve land 
for future use. 
B. Costs and Criticisms of Land Use Controls 
The benefits of land use controls accrue both to the public and to private 
individuals. Public benefits tend to be diffuse, both geographically and over 
time. Benefits to private individuals occur, for , in the form of in-
creases in property values when the supply of similar land is restricted or when 
nearby negative externalities are eliminated. These likely to receive 
less attention, however, than the windfall losses or caused by land 
use controls. 
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Windfall gains and losses due to land use controls are essentially a dis-
tributional effect. To counteract this effect it is theoretically possible to 
implement a system of compensation.9 Besides creating distributional effects, 
land use controls also impose real costs upon society, i.e., losses in economic 
output or productivity. Both types of costs are examined below.lO 
1. Reduction in the Market's Allocative Efficienc1 - Allocative efficiency 
is, most simply, a state of affairs in which resources go to their highest-
valued use. By limiting the amount of land available for certain uses and ex-
panding the amount of land available for other uses, the land use control au-
thority impairs the allocative efficiency of the market. Surpluses and shortages 
of land for various uses thus arise. For instance, a common criticism of 
municipal zoning is that it restricts new building to lots of large minimum 
size. Homebuyers who wish to purchase homes on smaller lots are thus frustrated. 
In effect, the supply of large-lot houses is artificially increased, while the 
supply of small-lot houses has a ceiling placed on it. Increasing the supply 
of the large-lot houses tends to lower their price and contributes to "urban 
sprawl"--rapid spatial growth of cities--by making large parcels on the urban 
fringes cheap relative to small ones inside the city. When the allocative 
efficiency of the market is impaired in this manner, the general economic wel-
fare is diminished. 
2. Increased Costs of Administration - Competitive markets have the desir-
able effect of reducing the costs of obtaining information about goods. Buyers 
and sellers have an incentive to exchange information in order to maximize their 
own gains. Imposition of land use controls necessitates an administrative 
structure to impose the community's values over those of prive individuals. To 
the degree that land use controls replace the private market as an allocation 
mechanism, the information cost-minimizing feature of the market is impaired. 
Buyers and sellers must expend greater effort in determining which transactions 
are allowed or have conditions placed upon them, and in assessing how future 
profit prospects are altered with changes in land use controls. 
The direct costs of administration by the land use control authority should 
be included as well. These costs are borne by the community, whereas in un-
regulated private markets only the individuals engaging in transactions pay 
the costs of information and transactions. 
3. Costs of Delay - Among the more important costs imposed on developers 
by land use controls is the cost of delay in the process of approval of permits, 
variances, etc. Various schemes exist for classifying the costs of delay. But 
it should be noted from the outset that many of these costs of delay are not 
real costs to the economy. Rather, they are transfers of wealth among present 
and future owners of land. For example, interest charges and taxes on land 
awaiting development may be partially or wholly passed on to future purchasers.l1 
Delay may also be to the net advantage of the landholder if inflation in land 
prices is greater than the other costs of delay. An additional point to be 
emphasized is that many developers wait until a building permit is approved be-
fore taking out the construction loan and therefore do not incur many of these 
costs of delay. Estimates of the component costs of delay are provided in 
Chapter III. 
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4. Effects Upon Growth - Besides altering the type of growth a community 
experiences, land use controls can also be used to affect the amount of growth. 
This is particularly so in the coase of "slow growth" or "no growth" controls. 
"Critical area" land use controls are sometimes pointed to as diminishing 
growth absolutely in their attempt to preserve present uses. In fact, however, 
the effect on the absolute level of growth depends strongly upon possibilities 
of substituting other land for the regulated land, though the possibilities of 
substitution diminish as more land comes under land use controls. This becomes 
especially significant when it is realized that the impetus for imposing land 
use controls comes from the attempt to preserve a dwindling supply of available 
land. 
There is another type of substitution effect due to land use controls: the 
substitution of other goods for housing when land use controls restrict buyers 
from entering the housing market. To the extent that would-be home buyers sub-
stitute other consumer goods rather than savings for housing, aggregate demand 
in the economy is not diminished. 
5. Distributional and Equity Effects - Windfall gains and losses to prop-
erty owners are only the most obvious distributional effects of land use con-
trols. More subtle is the effect of land use controls in presumably pricing 
lower- and middle-income families out of the market. By restricting the re-
maining supply of buildable land, critical area zoning is said to push prices 
beyond the reach of lower-income families. The costs of delay and land use 
control administration also raise prices; current owners of property stand to 
gain from these effects. But since property ownership is skewed toward higher-
income families, lower-income families are not equally benefited by price in-
creases induced by land use controls.l2 
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III 
REPRESENTATIVE RESEARCH 
While there is a weighty body of literature dealing with economic concepts 
such as externalities and public goods, little theoretical literature exists 
concerning these concepts specifically in terms of land use controls. Repre-
sentative examples of this scant theoretical literature on the economics of 
land use controls are discussed below, organized by the topics of the previous 
sections. 
The empirical research on the economic impact of land use controls focuses 
almost exclusively on measuring and explaining changes in housing and land 
prices. This is undoubtedly because property values are the most easily ob-
servable and readily available data to the researcher. In the following dis-
cussion, therefore, it is these studies which are considered. 
The research reported here was located through three primary searches: 
(1) Bergman's (1974) "Development Controls and Housing Costs." His extensive 
search netted a meager dozen "good quality" studies utilizing the following 
sources: 
... a mail survey of 300 selected individuals and organizations; 
a computer search of the National Technical Information Service 
file via the Lockheed Information Services Laboratory; and a 
thorough library search which relied upon scanning several refer-
ence indices, cross-checking of footnotes and bibliographies, and 
sorting through the card files or catalogs of several libraries--
including that of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(Bergman, 1974:529). 
The criteria he used for selection of studies were: 
1) an appraisal of the validity of techniques and methods used 
in each report, 2) an appraisal of the findings of all research 
reports, and 3) the policy relevance (Bergman, 1974:528-29). 
(2) A November 1976 literature search of land use control impacts utilizing the 
inform data base was conducted by the University of California, Riverside, 
General Library and yielded additional sources. (3) A personal library search 
by the author uncovered even more studies, especially recent ones. Criteria 
used in selecting studies from this search were: (a) specific relevance to land 
use controls, economic content, (c) methodological sophistication, and (d) 
statistical significance of results. 
Especially lacking are economic impact studies of state and regional land 
use controls. Healy (1976:168) laments that "The economic effects of controls 
are difficult to assess, both because of the short time period in which most 
controls have been in operation and the almost complete absence of scholarly 
studies of the issue." 
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A. Externality Zoning and the Reduction in Market Efficiency 
In their theoretical analysis of zoning, Ohls, Weisberg, and 
White (1974) have shown that in general one cannot predict if or in which way 
the price structure will change with the imposition of or a revision in zoning 
practices. The resulting price structure for land on the "price 
elasticity of demand" for specific types of land and upon the number of munici-
palities practicing zoning in the same land market. The fewer the number of 
municipalities practicing similar zoning, the more choice the consumer has among 
types of zoning, including unzoned land. If the land whose supply is restricted 
by zoning is inelastic in demand (a 1 percent rise in price induces a less 
than 1 percent cut in the amount demanded), the value of that land will increase. 
(One would expect the demand for coastal land to be more price inelastic than 
inland land because in the latter there are few close substitutes for the pack-
age of coastal attributes, which includes beach access, ocean view, and air 
quality. Unfortunately, no empirical study has attempted to measure the price 
elasticity of demand of land on the California coast.) Courant (1976) has 
extended the analysis of Ohls, Weisberg,and White to a general equilibrium 
approach and found that their conclusions remain valid. 
The empirical study covering the geographical area of all studies 
considered is Siegan's (1972) analysis of land use in unzoned Houston, Texas. 
In comparing Houston with similar cities practicing zoning, he concluded that 
the patterns of land use were essentially the same. In Houston, residential 
uses tended to congregate and to separate themselves from industrial and com-
mercial uses, largely irt response to real estate market forces. This result 
leads him to question the efficacy of zoning as a means of reducing external-
ities from "incompatible uses." He notes two minor differences in land use 
between the cities which, however, do not alter his basic conclusion: 
(1) Houston has a greater variety of land uses in any given area, which 
is ascribed to demand factors. For example, the corner grocery store 
is alive and well in Houston, serving a neighborhood need, while it 
may be excluded from residential in zoned cities. 
(2) Changes in land use tend to be more rapid than in zoned cities. De-
caying neighborhoods attract a motley assortment of enterprises as 
property values fall and marginal businesses locate there. Hore 
rapid decay means that demolition occurs sooner, hastening new develop-
ment. 
A number of more localized studies have attempted to determine the effects 
of varying land uses upon property values in zoned cities. The disparity in 
their results also calls into question the economic rationale for externality 
zoning. 
Bergman (1974), in a study related to the one quoted above, found "a weak 
to moderate, but uniformly positive, relationship between single-family housing 
costs and zoning controls in metropolitan areas."l3 
sens At close-in 
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locations, the study found, lots zoned for ten units per acre 
sold at prices almost seven times as great as similar lots zoned 
for one unit per acre.l4 
In one of the first of such studies, Crecine, Davis, and Jackson (1967) 
found no discernable pattern of property values differing with nearby "undesir-
able" land uses (such as multi-family apartments in single-family neighborhoods). 
They expected to find lower property values associated with the proximity of 
such uses. But in half the city blocks in their analysis they found property 
values positively correlated with undesirable uses. The remaining half showed 
the expected negative correlation. This even split led Crecine et al. to reason 
that the presence of undesirable land uses exerts a random effect on nearby 
property values. Since this finding was at odds with the prevailing rationale 
of zoning as a separator of incompatible uses, Crecine et al. concluded that 
much municipal zoning is superfluous. They posited the existence of "a process 
of self selection which helps to remove the externalities relevant to the market" 
(Crecine, Davis, and Jackson, 1967:94). Their major conclusion is that: 
The evidence which was examined in this paper casts doubt upon 
the notion that neighborhood effects abound in the urban property 
market. The evidence suggests independence rather than inter-
dependence .... If neighborhood effects do exist but are local so 
that they could not be observed by the methods used in this 
paper, then present zoning methods would appear to be less than 
fully appropriate. Efforts should be made to find restrictions 
which create independence in the market (Crecine, Davis, and 
Jackson, 1967:95). 
Reuter (1973) conducted a similar study in the same city (Pittsburgh) as 
Crecine et al. did. He correlated the price of a parcel with the different 
types of land use within 150 feet and again within 300 feet. This procedure was 
an improvement on that of Crecine et al., which considered land uses solely 
within the same city block of the parcel. Reuter, like Crecine et al., found a 
random pattern of positive and negative influences of land uses on price. His 
conclusions are: 
l) ... there is much more independence in urban property markets 
than the zoning ordinance anticipates. 2) ... there is little 
likelihood that all of the external effects anticipated by the 
zoning ordinance actually arise in urban property markets (Reuter, 
1973:334-36). 
Reuter also questions the efficacy of municipal zoning in light of the incon-
clusive statistical results. 
Stull (1975) puts the results of Reuter and of Crecine, Davis, and Jackson 
in perspective by noting that: 
.•. several other investigators, though not as directly con-
cerned with the relationship between land use environment and 
property values as Crecine et al., have reported results which 
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differ from those of the Pittsburgh study. For example, John Kain 
and John Quigley, in an important and comprehensive study, found 
that an index which measured the presence of commercial and in-
dustrial uses on a parcel's block face exerted a significant 
negative effect on both apartment rents and single-family home 
values (Stull, 1975:552). 
Stull lists two other studies as finding similar results: Harris, 
Harrell (1968); and Wieand (1973). Stull reports: 
The substantive results of the research reported in this article 
are directly contrary to those obtained by the two Pittsburgh 
studies. I found that property markets in the Boston SMSA 
[Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area] were characterized by 
a substantial amount of interdependence in that the value of the 
typical single-family property depended s upon com-
munity land use patterns (Stull, 1975:552). 
, and 
He does not, however, see policy implications opposite to those of Crecine et al. 
and Reuter, who urge the weakening of zoning regulations. Stull poses two alter-
natives: 
(1) The statistical significance of nearby land uses may imply that zoning 
has not, in fact, separated such uses. may be inherently in-
effectual because of the pressures of its If 
this is the correct analysis of zoning's effect, then Stull enter-
tains the notion of scrapping the apparatus and saving the 
cost of administration. 
(2) If zoning is not ineffectual, there are still other reasons for 
restricting its application, such as its exclusionary nature (Stull, 
1975:553). 
Another variety of externality zoning is the building code, which is de-
signed to ensure uniform housing quality within the community, thereby lessen-
ing the negative externality which "substandard" housing imposes on adjacent 
property. In these studies there is also a wide disparity of results. 
Local imposition of "unnecessary" building codes is estimated to con-
tribute additional costs to residential construction ranging from a few percent 
to a substantial fraction of the structure cost. ("Unnecessary" here means 
overly stringent from the point of view of health and safety considerations.) 
The estimate generally depends on the estimation techniques used and the 
affiliation of the author, i.e., whether he is associated with the construction 
industry or not. 
But there are more important and far-reaching impacts of building codes 
than increases in structure costs. Field and Rivkin (1975) in their book, The 
Building Code Burden, assert that "Misuses of regulatory powers has resulted 
in higher than necessary housing costs, obstruction of new building technol-
ogies, inefficient use of scarce national resources and discrimination against 
lower income and Rivkin, 1975:129). 
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For example, besides the familiar case of local building codes pushing 
housing costs up, there are "system costs" imposed by features of the building 
code regulatory apparatus as a whole. McConnaughey (1977) describes the 
building code system as follows: 
In addition to local and state building codes, major elements of 
the building code system are model codes, voluntary standards 
which are referenced in codes, and the public and private test-
ing, certifying, research, or coordinating organizations which 
are specif concerned with building codes and standards 
(McConnaughey, 1977:12). 
McConnaughey's examples include (1) costs of overlapping jurisdictions and 
regulations, and (2) inhibition of economies of scale by variation in building 
codes over local authorities. He summarizes: 
Building Code System 1mpacts upon the cost of housing may be 
substantial. It is this type of impact which has been the 
central concern of the ACIR [Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations], Douglas Commission, and Kaiser Com-
mittee reports. Moreover, most of the reforms initiated or 
recommended address reforms of the building code system 
(McConnaughey, 1977:12). 
In one of the most thorough and methodologically well-conceived empirical 
studies, Sagalyn and Sternlieb (1972) conduct multiple regression analysis using 
the prices of recently built New Jersey homes and specific features of local 
building and zoning codes. They find that variables representing specific 
provisions in zoning ordinances and building codes, as well as delay in build-
ing permit approval, are statistically significant. However, the influence 
of each variable independently is weak (Sagalyn and Sternlieb, 1972:66-70). 
In a recent study, Muth and Wetzler (1976) include variables representing 
constraints on the housing market in a previously derived "best fit" regression 
equation of house price on various structural characteristics. One result is 
that "the coefficient of the locally modified national building code variable, 
while positive, suggests that such codes add only about 17¢/sq.ft. (in 1966-67 
dollars) to structure costs or less than two percent of the average for all 
observations in the sample" (Muth and Wetzler, 1976:65). This finding agrees 
with the results of a study by Maisel (1953) in which he concluded that "un-
necessary" building codes had but slight effect on house costs. 
These results conflict with construction industry studies showing sub-
stantially greater cost effects of building codes. McConnaughey cites two 
reasons for the disparate results: first, the building code of any given 
municipality may contain both restrictive and lenient prov1s1ons. Char-
acterizing local building codes as either restrictive or lenient (or some-
thing intermediate) may mask their detailed effect on housing costs. Further-
more, each study uses a different measure of restrictiveness of building 
codes, which quite reasonably can be expected to lead to differing results. 
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A second reason for conflicting study results is that they are 
conducted in vastly different code jurisdictions. A finding in 
one code jurisdiction that restrictive local codes increase 
direct construction costs by a substantial amount need not con-
flict with an opposite from a different location. Al-
though each study may be valid, attention is likely to be fo-
cused upon the study finding substantial cost impacts. More-
over, some persons may commit the of composition 
believing that since codes substant increase the 
cost of housing in one location substantially increase the 
cost of housing for the nation as a whole as well (McConnaughey, 
1977:8). 
No study which examines the cost of state or regional 
(such as for earthquake safety) across various jurisdictions and 
come to light. 
Finally, studies differ in the of aggregation of data. While one 
study (such as Muth and Wetzler's) may attempt to extract statistical 
ions 
izations from individual units as large as a Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, other studies focus on individual subdivisions. 
B. Public Goods 
These aspects of land use controls remain poorly researched at both the 
theoretical and empirical levels. Theoretical work on these topics is at a 
general level, with land use controls a straightforward application of 
the theory. From the broadest perspective, environmentally related land use 
controls can be said to segment the market for residential land into two dis-
tinct markets: (1) one market which consists of land immune from regulation, 
usually because of its being already--partially or wholly--built up (there is 
only a limited supply of this of land available); and (2) another market, 
for new land subject to the controls. While the supply of land in this market 
is potentially large, regulations on its use limit its availability and raise 
its price (Solomon, 1976:16-17). 
Empirical studies are hampered by measurement problems. For example, to 
determine the community demand for public goods such as open space and un-
hindered views, individuals' willingness to pay must be known. But this is 
difficult to discern from questionnaires, since respondents may bias their 
responses downward if they perceive that they can act as "free riders." And 
since public goods generally affect the entire community, within-community 
comparisons of property values to determine the effect of the public good are 
of little benefit. A similar problem exists in attempting to find the value 
of environmental quality, so that land use controls can be designed to provide 
the optimal amount of it. A major problem in determining option value lies in 
estimating the value which future generations will ascribe to land 
for their use. 
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Despite these problems, there is much fruitful research still to be done 
in the field of local controls on growth and environmentally related land use 
controls such as critical area zoning in floodplains and coastal areas. The 
lack of literature on these increasingly important forms of land use controls 
reflects not only the difficulties mentioned above but the absence of data and 
the recent origin of many of these controls as well. 
C. Maintaining and Increasing the Economic Base 
One of the most outstanding and thorough empirical studies of land use con-
trols is The Costs of Sprawl by the Real Estate Research Corporation (1974), 
which documents the fact that unhindered private development imposes public 
service costs much greater than the costs of a denser, more planned type of 
development. Once the existing public service capacity is exceeded, the in-
creased public service cost of new development may outweigh the tax revenue 
it generates. Such a situation necessitates three alternatives: (1) increase 
the local property tax rate, (2) lower the level of public services provided, 
or (3) control growth "The Economics of Petaluma," by Claude Gruen (1975), 
provides one of the few discussions available of the applications of the Costs 
of Sprawl study to land use control policymaking in a town which has attempted 
to control its own growth. 
Molotch (1976) has provided a theory of why cities adopt either growth-
oriented or "slow growth" policies. He argues that most cities act to maximize 
their growth rate because local businesses gain from growth and city councils 
are composed primarily of local businessmen. However, when growth would damage 
the character of the city and impair the general business climate, or make it 
a less attractive place for powerful local residents to live, zoning controls 
which restrict growth may be adopted. 
In addition, Molotch is one of the few writers to stress that local growth 
controls, viewed within the context of large geographical areas, probably 
transfer growth among areas but do not diminish it absolutely. 
D. Cost of Delay 
Various estimates of the cost of delay due to land use controls exist;lS 
they vary widely, depending upon the assumptions of the author. These studies 
lack explanatory power because they do not trace the hypothesized causes of 
cost through to the sale prices of actual houses by employing current statis-
tical techniques. The following table shows some of the highest estimates of 
the cost of delay. It is taken from California Environmental Quality Act and 
the Cost of Delay, by the Construction Industry Research Board (1976). 
Components of Delay Costs 
Land holding costs 
Building cost inflation 
Overhead costs 
Foregone revenues 
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Annual Cost of Delay 
Low-High Ranges 
1. 2%-2.2% 
3.0-13.0 
4.0-10.0 
1.2-1.4 
Muller and James provide a much lower estimate of the impact of the same 
act: a total cost increase of only 0.6% (Muller and James, 1975:15-20). 
One aspect of delay which is often ignored is the benefits of delay. Delay 
is necessary in order to compile information which public decisionmakers re-
quire. Without such information, public regulation of land use would be per-
functory at best. (A study to measure both the benefits and costs of delay is 
described as the seventh in the Research Needs chapter that follows.) 
Furthermore, many of the costs of delay are not real costs in the sense 
of losses in real output to the economy. Rather, they are transfers from 
developers to other groups such as landowners, banks, and subcontractors. 
E. Distributional Effects 
Only recently have economists attempted to provide a rigorous theoretical 
base to zoning's distributional effects. White (1975) constructs a mathematical 
model which reaches two main conclusions: 
(1) Zoning's effect on city size and on land values can be either positive 
or negative, depending upon various characteristics of the real estate 
market. 
(2) " ... the major benefit of zoning may be the ab to ensure that 
one's neighbors have the same income, the same taste for housing and 
demand for public services as oneself. In this sense the benefit 
from zoning accrues to suburban dwellers generally, while its cost 
is borne by center city residents who have no such exclus power" 
(White, 1975:290). 
F. Summary 
The studies discussed show the extent to which the literature addresses the 
economic considerations involved in land use controls. Deficiencies in both the 
theoretical and empirical literature exist. The inconclusiveness of even well-
designed studies argue for expanded research, especially empirical research 
using current statistical methodology. 
Almost all of the studies reviewed are concerned with property values and 
construction costs. Also, they are from a micro perspective (focusing on a 
specific locale and market) as opposed to a macro approach, which would survey 
a broader geographical area and incorporate other economic variables, such as 
mobility of the labor force, industrial plant siting choice, and land use con-
trols in adjacent areas. (The economic studies of the coastal commissions, by 
contrast, are generally more macro in focus; they estimate the coastal com-
mission's effect over a broader geographical area and for a variety of sectors 
of the economy.) The total number of studies on the economic impact of land 
use controls is so small that ions made from them are tenuous. For 
example, from the disparate results of Crecine et al., Reuter, and Stull, it 
is difficult to draw conclusions the actual effects of on 
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property values. A greater number of similar studies must be completed before 
unambiguous conclusions can be reached. 
For purposes of the present report, the studies of the preceding section 
are most important in that they do provide statistical tests of the impacts of 
land use controls. Such tests are, given the current "state of the art," the 
ultimate criteria by which the economic impact of land use controls can be 
measured. 
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IV 
ECONOMICS OF LAND USE CONTROL IN THE COASTAL ZONE: 
THE CASE OF CALIFORNIA 
A. The Economic Resources 
1. zone resources - The 
value o its unique attri-
butes of demand for them. Since it is a thin 
interface between thousands of miles of ocean on the one side and thousands of 
miles of land on the other, the coastal zone is, in strictly physical terms, 
less abundant than either the land or the sea. This in itself does not imply 
that the coastal zone will have a high value. But when we add the desire for 
the attributes of the coast to its physical uniqueness, it is evident that 
coastal zone resources will command a high 
The unique attributes of the coastal zone as an interface or passageway 
between the land and the sea is the basis of its location value. The location 
value of the coastal zone is to some reflected in the value of resources 
existing in the coastal zone, or in the value of products produced there. Among 
the locational attributes of the coastal zone are: (1) proximity to transporta-
tion networks which have expanded from the port to inland and overseas routes; 
(2) access to population centers, many of which have grown up around initial 
coastal sites; (3) seen beauty, which is an important determinant of the 
demand for coastal hous ; and (4) moderate climate, which reduces heating 
and cooling costs for all economic activities and is a prime input in coastal 
agriculture. 
2. Competing demands for coastal resources One of the major conflicts 
over coastal resources is their use as inputs to production versus their direct 
consumption by individuals. The market allocates coastal resources according 
to their highest valued use of any type. In doing so, the market automatically 
considers the highest valued alternative use of the resource, its "opportunity 
cost." For example, the opportunity cost of using a scenic beach for a nuclear 
power plant site may be the value of the beach's scenic amenity which must be 
forgone in constructing the plant there. The market assures that the opportunity 
cost of a given activity is less than the value of the activity itself, other-
wise the alternative activity would be undertaken. 
There are at least two major problems that arise with market allocation, 
however. First, many coastal resources cannot be easily priced and efficiently 
allocated by the market because of their externality or public-good nature. 
Second, the distributional consequences of the market may contradict social 
goals. The widely held view that the coast should be accessible to all individ-
uals conflicts with the market criterion of coastal resources' going to the 
highest bidder. It was partially in response to the distributional consequences 
of the market that voters approved California's Proposition 20, placing interim 
development controls on the coastal zone et al., 1974). 
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B. Costs of Coastal Zone Management 
In discussing the economic costs imposed by coastal zone management, it is 
important to understand several concepts. First, much of the economic dis-
location due to coastal zone management is not a net loss to the economy, but 
a transfer of wealth and income among economic agents. Much of this disloca-
tion can be viewed as the response of the public to the inability of the private 
market to provide sufficient quantities of public goods such as open space, 
beach recreation, and clean coastal air. The public agency involved in coastal 
zone management is in effect performing a desired function which the market 
cannot. To label the transfers involved in aiding the market in this manner 
as "costs" therefore obscures the function of public choice which coastal zone 
management performs. 
Second, other costs imposed by coastal zone management are actually inter-
generational transfers. a coastal resource for the use of future 
generations places a cost on the present generation in terms of forgone current 
output (an "opportunity cos ). The flow of environmental services which this 
resource may provide during its preservation must also be counted as a benefit. 
In assessing these benefits and costs, the choice of an appropriate discount 
rate to apply to these services is critical. It is generally held that the 
market rate of interest undervalues future consumption at the expense of present 
consumption because present consumers will not live to consume in future genera-
tions. The coastal zone management authority must therefore find a rate of 
discount that will enable it to calculate how much of the complement of coastal 
resources to preserve over time. 
Third, there is a net loss to the economy when a coastal zone management 
decision decreases the productivity of coastal resources. But it should be 
borne in mind that not all coastal resources are counted as "productive" in 
the calculation of Gross National Product. For example, a decision not to 
build a refinery in the coastal zone may diminish the productivity of the 
facility, but it may also maintain the "productivity" of the coast to provide 
scenic vistas, clean air, suitable marine habitat, etc., all of which are not 
calculated as a strictly economic gain. 
The costs of coastal zone management, then, include: (1) loss in produc-
tivity, in purely economic terms; (2) loss in welfare for those individuals 
prevented from personally consuming coastal amenities (as residents); (3) loss 
in output due to non-substitutability of inland resources for coastal ones; 
(4) direct costs of administration; and (5) costs of delay. 
C. Research on the California Experience 
A large part of the case study literature on the economics of coastal zone 
management focuses on the California Many of these studies were 
undertaken to evaluate the potential economic impact of the suggested policies 
in the California Coastal Plan, prepared by the coastal commissions and submitted 
to the 1976 California lature. The California studies are generally 
superior to those describ coastal zone management in other states because 
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they can rely upon the of the commissions. Where the studies of 
other states' programs hypothesize, the California studies have a data base 
upon which to j economic impacts, at least in the aggregate. Unfortunately, 
even the California studies are for the most part not thorough empirical studies 
using appropriate data and current methodology. Rather, they 
are something akin to an economic version of the most loosely construed and 
speculative environmental impact report required today of many development 
projects. To evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each study, to facili-
tate comparison, and to indicate the direction necessary for research, the 
following evaluative criteria are applied: (1) methodology; (2) data base; (3) 
time frame; (4) types of costs and benefits considered; (5) assumptions; (6) 
conclusions; and (7) validity, based on economic theory and related studies.l6 
Of course, because of the variation in the studies not all of the criteria can 
be applied to each instance. 
1. 
This is a of data on the economic characteristics of the coastal 
zone to the extent possible from existing sources. It is the most comprehen-
sive general data base available to researchers of the California coastal zone. 
Besides its hundreds of statistical tables, the study provides a discussion of 
the major economic features of the coastal zone and their change over time. 
Where possible, generalizations are derived from the statistical tables. While 
it does not attempt to link changes in economic variables with the activities 
of the coastal commission, the study does provide data from which some conclu-
sions may be inferred. (These will be below in discussing research 
which uses this work as a data base.) 
The data are tabulated by three separate geographical divisions: (1) coastal 
counties; (2) the five-mile "planning area"; and (3) where data exist, the 
1,000-yard "permit zone" of the coastal commission. There is relatively scant 
information on the all-important permit zone. Studies using this work as a 
data base have therefore frequently opted for comparisons using the five-mile 
planning area as the relevant area affected by the costal commission's regu-
lation. Since only 1,000 yards of the five-mile planning area are under the 
coastal commission's permit regulation, this technique can lead to serious mis-
takes in estimating the commission's economic impact. The topics under which 
the California Coastal Zone Economic organizes the presented data include 
public land , employment, personal income, retail trade, 
financial institutions, housing, building and construction, home price trends, 
assessed value of prop , basic industries, international trade, and trans-
portation. Data entries with 1960 and continue until 1974. Heavy re-
liance is upon 1970 Census data. 
This volume is not an ical but a discourse upon and 
predicted in the state and national economy, with emphasis upon the 
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California Coastal Plan as a strategy for facilitating these changes and 
minimizing the cost of transition in coastal areas. The methodology of Rooney's 
study consists primarily of identifying and quantifying trends in economic vari-
ables, then analyzing their impacts and relating these predicted impacts with 
the plan's policies. Data on these trends come from three sources: 
1. General economic data such as the cost of labor, capital, and farm 
commodities. 
2. Surveys of future resource availability: Paley Commission (1952), 
Lansberg (1963), Committee on Resources and Man (1969), The Club of 
Rome (1972), and the National Commissions on Materials Policy (1973). 
3. Data on energy consumption in California. 
Rooney consciously eschews the benefit/cost methodology widely used to 
assess economic impacts of programs such as the California Coastal Plan: 
This benefit/cost study would involve placing economic values 
on such public goods as scenic vistas, beach recreational re-
sources, biologically optimum populations of marine organisms, 
cleaner air and water, maintenance of unique or lower income 
coastal communities, and a whole host of environmental and 
social factors which contribute significantly to the overall 
quality of life. Since these environmental and social factors 
are public goods which are not bought and sold on competitive 
markets, there is no reasonable way to economic values 
on them (Rooney, 1975:37). 
He concludes that "the direct and indirect economic impacts ... on private goods 
and services must be measured along with, but independently of, the basically 
qualitative assessments of ... environmental and social impacts" (Rooney, 1975: 
42). 
Rooney, himself a former chairman of the South Coast Regional Coastal Corn-
mission, does not purport to measure these impacts in his study. Instead, he 
provides a qualitative discussion of environmental and natural resource policy, 
focusing on the California coast. Policies at issue which are likely to yield 
benefits and costs are: (1) recycling, (2) aiding and directing technical 
progress, (3) resource conservation, (4) energy consumption, (5) open space 
preservation, (6) "sustained yield" exploitation, (7) agricultural--and other--
land conversion, and (8) "planning" vs. the market mechanism. 
The time frame of Rooney's study is perhaps the longest of all those re-
viewed. His assumptions about future resource availability are derived from 
the trend of historical and recent data, then projected into the future to 
yield the scenario against which the California Coastal Plan's policies are 
evaluated. A major assumption is that the prices of food, land, capital, 
natural resources, and environmental goods are increasing and can be expected 
to increase relative to the price of labor. Furthermore, Rooney assumes that 
the market mechanism alone is incapable of providing a transition to this new 
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economic era without great social and e costs, bottlenecks, inefficiencies, 
etc., unless it is complemented by planning and policy implementation. 
The main conclusion of Rooney's study is that the plan provides the policies 
which will ease this transition: 
... [it] generally encourages and facilitates the kinds of 
economic adaptations that are essential if California's 
economy is going to progress in the economic, social and 
ecological environment of the next couple of decades 
(Rooney, 1975:66). 
The validity of Rooney's conclusions rests on two factors: the projection 
of relative price trends and the efficacy of the market mechanism. Though no 
projection is foolproof, 's does seem to capture the essence of recent 
price changes and their implications when extended into the future. Whether 
the market mechanism, unaided can provide an efficacious transition is an 
assertion left unproved. a more relevant question for analysis would 
be, ''Is the present panoply of government regulations sufficiently flexible to 
provide the transition at minimum cost?" The practical question is not one of 
the market versus nonmarket means of allocation. The question is how much 
regulation is sufficient. Rooney's analysis does not really provide an answer 
to that question other than to elaborate upon the direction in which the plan's 
policies will shape the economy. In order to begin to answer the question of 
how much regulation is needed, a study of the effects of coastal com-
mission regulation must be undertaken. 
3. of Coastal Urban Land Institute 
This paper lists and describes the benefits of coastal zone management 
and provides dollar estimates of the benefits taken from existing data sources. 
No attempt is made to describe or measure the costs of coastal zone management. 
The authors' assumptions are made clear by the following passage: 
... there are no "universal" benefits or costs related to coastal 
zone management. Neither is it certain that all management pro-
grams will result in net positive impacts. On balance, however, 
it seems conceptually possible in most cases to use management 
techniques to generate more benefits than costs, but the extent 
to which that objective is realized will depend on the good 
judgment exercised in program development and implementation. 
Both benefits and costs are highly variable and only a 
systematic, complete analysis of conservation and development 
options will ensure a net benefit of results (Urban Land 
Institute, 1976:2). 
The benefits of coastal zone fall under the following categories: 
a. environmental protection 
b. recreational and tourist uses 
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c. aquaculture, mariculture, and coastal agriculture 
d. oil, gas, and mineral extraction 
e. energy generation, transport, and processing 
f. port facilities 
g. planning of development, especially residential 
h. regulatory agency streamlining 
Estimates of past and current value of resources produced and/or consumed 
in the coastal zone most likely are accurate, given the sources used. Projections 
of the future value of these resources, however, are less reliable, since as-
sumptions about future economic trends and events underlie them. More important, 
however, the study generally overlooks the "exclusionary" nature of certain 
benefits in calculating their value. }funy uses of the coastal zone exclude other 
uses by their very nature. Use of the ocean's assimilative capacity to neutralize 
sewerage excludes its use for acquaculture and mariculture, and perhaps recreation. 
Plant siting and residential development preclude the use of these locations for 
open space and habitat preservation. Though the report does mention the 
nature of uses in the coastal zone, the point is not stressed adequately. 
Projection of economic values derived from the coastal zone \vithout con-
sideration of the conflicts between alternative uses results in serious over-
estimates of the total value of coastal zone resources and its constituent 
categories. In short, the report makes a "fallacy of composition." The point 
is not made that a major function of coastal zone management is to weigh the 
value (both dollar and unquantifiable) of economic activities in the coastal 
zone, and decide which conflicting uses shall be reduced or eliminated. 
The report is on safer theoretical ground when it discusses the (non-
quantifiable) benefits of wise coastal zone management, as opposed to its dis-
cussion of the values of coastal zone resources and coastal zone economic 
activity themselves. Its major conclusion is that coastal zone management is 
needed for the following reasons: 
(1) The private market does not value coastal public goods in a way 
which represents people's demands. 
(2) The private market values present consumption so much more than 
future consumption that there is a tendency for nonrenewable coastal 
resources to be rapidly depleted. 
(3) Coastal land use controls administered by local authorities fre-
quently result in patterns of use which disadvantage regional, state, 
and national needs. Unwillingness of towns to site port and energy 
facilities within their boundaries are examples. 
(4) The complex, uncoordinated, and overlapping regulatory structure in 
the coastal zone produces uncertainty and inefficiency for the public 
and private users of the coastal zone.l7 
The shortcomings of the market mechanism listed are generally acknowledged 
in economic theory. But it is also acknowledged that regulation of the market 
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has historically led to the difficulties mentioned in the last two points. The 
problem of the "optimal level of regulation" is an important and unresolved 
issue in economic theory. Benefits of Coastal Zone Management would make more 
of a contribution if it addressed this issue. Simply describing the benefits 
without specifying the level and degree of regulation involved allows one to 
choose a "best-of-all-possible-worlds" approach without considering the 
difficulties of attaining this optimal level and degree of regulation. This 
shortcoming is closely related to the report's failure to discuss the costs 
of coastal zone management. 
4. Business Prospects Under Coastal Zone Management, by the Real Estate 
Research Corporation (1976). 
The title of the report is a misoner since only the benefits of coastal 
zone management are discussed. Prospects was prepared as a companion 
to Benefits, discussed above. It focuses even more heavily than the latter on 
the impacts of the California Coastal Plan. The report considers three cate-
gories of impacts "because they account for the preponderance of potential 
change (both positive and negative) in business prospects that might result 
from implementation of the policies and programs outlined in the California 
plan" (Real Estate Research Corporation, 1976:2). These categories are: 
(1) public investment in facilities and services (with and 
without the Plan), (2) the Plan's effect on land values, and 
(3) economic development--e.g., its impacts on employment, 
business investment and profitability, and construction 
activity (Real Estate Research Corporation, 1976:2). 
(1) Public investment: Prospects relies largely on the Real Estate Re-
search Corporation's The Costs of Sprawl (1974) for data on the costs of alter-
native densities of development and public investment required. The Sprawl 
study is an example of thorough, detailed empirical research and its con-
clusions have been frequently cited. The major finding of Sprawl is that 
situating development in the interstices of already developed areas (known as 
"infilling") incurs less cost in terms of public service investment than 
developing virgin land. The coastal commission preferred infilling to sprawl 
development in its de facto guidelines. But in contrast to the conclusions 
of Sprawl, the commission favored low- rather than high-density development, 
a policy which results in higher unit costs. 
(2) Land values: Prospects uses accepted economic theory in concluding 
that "restricting land use options will lower land values of subject properties, 
but will also transfer any unsatisfied demand to other competitive sites not 
subject to use restrictions" (Real Estate Research Corporation, 1976:8). A 
table which lists expected results from the California plan's policies on land 
values agrees with the conclusions derived from economic theory. 
(3) Economic development: The report provides qualitative estimates of 
plan policies on sectors of the economy. Categories of potential 
effects tabulated include employment, construction activity, investment/prof-
itability in other business sectors, and benefits/costs to the consumer. Their 
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conclusions appear to be the result of applying standard economic theory. Their 
methodology, however, does not capture the multiplicative and interconnective 
effects of initial economic impacts, effects which can be quite large. A more 
appropriate methodology is to construct an input-output model of the coastal 
economy and trace the mutliplicative and interconnective effects throughout 
various sectors. 
In addition, they describe the plan's effects as being short-run. There 
is no adequate empirical basis for this assertion. Indeed, economic theory 
implies that altering the pattern of land use as the plan anticipates will have 
long-range repercussions on the fabric of the coastal economy. 
5. 
The plan itself contains a scant two pages devoted to its possible economic 
impacts. The pages contain mostly a justification for plan policies by citing 
the benefits they will provide. The plan stresses that benefits from its 
policies will accrue over the long term, while losses can be expected to be 
short-term in nature. It cites the economic advantages of developing tourism 
as opposed to alternative uses of the coast; refers to the Costs of Sprawl study 
as a source of its "balanced" development policies; and discusses the value of 
preserving coastal agriculture, forests, and fisheries. Though estimates of 
the value of some of these economic activities are provided, cost estimates of 
the plan's policies are not given. In response to the deficiencies of the plan 
in documenting its economic impact, the California Senate passed a resolution 
sponsoring an economic impact study of the plan. The impact study was published 
as two sequential reports, discussed below. 
6. Economic Impacts of the Proposed Coastal Plan--A First Report and 
Further Proposals, by Economics Research Associates and Alvin H. Baum 
& Associates (October, 1975). 
This report is a "feasibility study" of performing economic impact is 
of the California Coastal plan. It does not rely on a specialized data base 
and its conclusions are qualitative rather than quantitative. "Impacts" describes 
its methodology: 
The research recommended in this report will not involve either 
a complex computer-based economic model, nor much computer time 
for data handling. This may disappoint some economists, partic-
ularly university economists who deal in broad projections. We 
are aware of the work going on at the frontiers of the profession, 
but we do not feel that it can be made to apply to the questions 
involved here. Our method--breaking down the impacts into rec-
ognizable and researchable components, and constructing data, 
however crude, that can be used with manageable assumptions--
seems to us most likely to provide the Legislature with under-
standable and best-possible estimates of what the Coastal Plan 
would actually mean to legislators' constituents (Economic Re-
search Associates et al ., 197~:9). 
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Impacts contains a novel "summary matrix" for the identification of eco-
nomic impacts of each of the plan's policies. The matrix is qualitative rather 
than quantitative. It tabulates the policies of the plan in terms of various 
categories of impacts: (A) commerce and industry; (B) housing; (C) "emerging 
economic values," such as scenic quality, social equity, public use, etc.; 
(D) land values; (E) public costs; and (F) public revenues. Since many of the 
de facto guidelines followed by the coastal commissions are carried over as 
plan policies, the matrix organizes impacts of the commissions in a manner 
that allows easy reference. 
The next section analyzes the "Most Significant Economic Issues" by group-
ing the plan's major policies around several issues and explicitly stating the 
arguments "for" and "against" each issue. The scope of the research needed to 
provide data on each issue is elaborated in detail. The discussion of each 
issue is of such high quality (from the perspective of applied economic 
analysis) as to make each one a small "grant proposal" in itself. The probing 
questions that should be asked from both sides of an issue are addressed. For 
example: (1) the efficacy of subsidizing coastal agriculture is questioned, 
because such agriculture could perhaps operate on unsubsidized inland; (2) to 
determine the benefits of providing increased recreation facilities, it is urged 
that the components of coastal recreation demand be estimated; (3) to provide 
data on the costs of the plan's implementation as well as its benefits, Impacts 
suggests that the costs of review and delay in the power plant siting process 
be estimated, using coastal commission as a guide; and (4) in general, 
conflicting implications of plan policies are brought to light and research on 
the value of the alternatives implied is stressed. 
Impacts sees the "most significant economic issues" as: (1) agricultural 
preservation and protection, (2) orderly balanced development, (3) recreation, 
(4) energy, and (5) ports. "Other significant issues" include: (1) marine en-
vironment, (2) coastal land environment, (3) appearance and design (of develop-
ment); (4) public access to the coast, (5) transportation, (6) low and moderate 
income housing, (7) coastal dependent and industrial development, (8) develop-
ment in hazardous areas, and (9) restoration of coastal resources. 
Given its very specific and explicitly limited methodological orientation, 
"Impacts" provides a thorough and objective economic analysis of the issues in-
volved and elaborates the means for researching them. If anything, the suggested 
research goals, while methodologically possible, are too extensive. A competent 
research program, including all their suggestions, would cost many times the 
$250,000 which the report estimates. 
7. Review of the California Coastal Plan, by ICF Associates, published 
by the Office of the California State Legislative Analyst (April, 
1976). 
This economic impact study resulted from the recommendations made in Impacts. 
A number of reports by various authors are included: 
the California Coastal Plan on Commercial and 
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involved two steps: (1) "development of a general framework within which to 
realistically assess impact" (ICF:2)(successively more specific assumptions 
about the area under study and the plan's policies are applied to subject 
developments); and (2) "analysis of specific costs that affect subject develop-
ments and benefits that accrue from them." The study is quite open in dis-
cussing its limitations: "Three factors limited the methodology and affected 
the degree of specificity of the findings and conclusions'' (ICF:2). These were: 
(1) "Empirical data are scarce .... Data which are available relate to the interim 
permit processing experience .... Experience under the interim process cannot be 
simply extrapolated to what might occur under the plan itself" (ICF:32); (2) "A 
consistent base line from which to evaluate the impact of Coastal Plan policies 
does not exist .... The land use picture throughout the state is in considerable 
flux .... One would find it extremely difficult to establish a base line that 
represents the current land use planning situation of all communities along the 
coast" (ICF:32); and (3) "The study was limited by resource constraints and 
thus is intended to provide only a preliminary assessment" (ICF:33). 
The study makes assumptions which define a specific type of development 
area, which characterizes only a portion of the coastal zone, albeit the 
"developable" portions. Assumptions include the type of land use and 
ment pressure, geography, governmental structure, utilities and transportation, 
and the degree of public ownership of land. The areas of the coastal zone which 
fit these assumptions are listed. 
Coastal Plan policies are divided into three categories: those that have 
direct, indirect, or no impact. Direct impacts stem from explicit regulations. 
Indirect impacts "affect all projects on an aggregate basis by affecting the 
amount or scale of development permitted" (ICF:37). The indirect impacts are 
then interpreted in one of two scenarios: minimum or maximum implementation of 
plan policies. 
Costs and benefits of implementation to developers and government are then 
detailed. Costs to the developer include regulation, delay, uncertainty, miti-
gation, and scarcity of development opportunities. Costs incurred government 
include investment and compensation. Unfortunately, costs are not analyzed 
according to whether they are a real cost to society or a redistribution, and 
whether a particular developer can pass these costs on in the sale price is 
not discussed. The study concludes that the plan will make large developments 
more costly in relation to small ones, but that some small- and medium-scale 
developers will be disadvantaged because of lack of experience in designing the 
type of projects specified in the plan. 
Benefits studied include (1) more efficient use of common resources (public 
investment), (2) higher demand for existing and newly developed housing and com-
mercial space, and (3) increased public voice in development. 
Overall, "Assessing" is quite explicit about its assumptions. They are 
chosen so as to typify most of the developable land along the coast. The focus 
is perhaps a bit too micro-economic oriented, the result of dividing up the 
affected economic units into categories for ease of analysis. 
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(B) "Economic Indicators of the Effects of the Appearance and Design 
Policies in Open Coastal Areas," edited by Jerry Yudelson. The study begins 
with the observation that: 
The basic problem in evaluating the economic effects of the 
Coastal Plan visual policies is that the benefits are mostly 
diffuse and qualitative, while the costs are concentrated and 
mostly quantitative (Yudelson, 1976:2 
With this in mind, the study proceeds: 
The basic study methodology was to identify which policies 
were binding for various development types, in a range of 
coastal situations, to identify design, planning and action 
responses available to meet the policy goals; and to assess 
the economic effects and benefits of such responses .... The 
cumulative costs of ting these policies were not eval-
uated. Several carefully chosen special case studies were 
used to illustrate the major categories of economic impact 
(Yudelson, 1976:1). 
The choice of case studies rather than an overall approach seems wise in evalu-
ating the plan's widely varying policies on appearance and design. In addition, 
much of the implementation of these is discretionary and subjective and 
many of the areas affected are unique. 
In the case studies a number of explicit assumptions are made, including: 
(1) visual policies will affect primarily the areas seaward of the nearest coastal 
highways; (2) "visual policies are applied 'at the end,' following all other 
important Coastal Plan policies ... which will take precedence"; and (3) a baseline 
of "no Plan" is used where policies are unclear; otherwise "the costs of a range 
of potential interpretations are given" (Yudelson, 1976:6). 
The cost/benefit analysis in the study is undertaken with the following ob-
servations: 
It is not possible to make a determination of the actual eco-
nomic impacts of the policies in the Plan because (1) future 
development patterns are not certain whether with or without 
the Coastal Plan: and (2) limitations are severe on obtaining 
data which have the area within the Coastal Zone as a basis 
(Yudelson, 1976:21). 
The analysis is performed, nevertheless, in the following steps: 
a) identification of 
b) evaluation of those 
how much, and for how 
of a specific policy .... 
ts in terms of who is affected 
long (Yudelson, 1976:21). 
how, 
It lists the major economic impacts derived 
in local and state tax bases, (2) increased 
planning and administrative costs; and (4) 
from the case studies as (1) changes 
investment, (3) increased 
in construction costs. 
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The study is one of the few to recommend the construction of a system of 
accounts: 
A system of cost/revenue accounts would be used in each case 
to record the fiscal impacts of the applicable policies on 
each sector of interest .... These economic functions [used in 
the system of cost/revenue accounts] are particularly useful 
in estimating the net impact of a policy which may induce a 
cost to one party and a benefit to another ... (Yudelson, 
1976:23). 
The main conclusion of the study is that implementation of visual policies 
may increase the cost of public and private developments by 5 to 10 percent 
over the baseline of "no Plan." Most of these costs are seen as short-term. 
8. California Coastal Plan Employment Impact, by Olive Mayer and 
Associates (May, 1976). 
Originally commissioned as a section of the above Review, this study was 
never published. It is the most thorough and detailed analysis of the employ-
ment effects of coastal zone management undertaken anywhere to date. Although 
it did not utilize a data base of individual employers, its treatment of more 
aggregated data is comprehensive. Focusing on San Diego, Mendocino, San Mateo, 
and San Luis Obispo counties, it contains an analysis of various California 
Coastal Plan policies under reasonable assumptions, many of them based on the 
experience of the coastal commissions. Categories of employment analyzed include 
agriculture, construction, tourism, and fishing/fisheries. 
The study attempts to provide a picture of the plan's employment impacts, 
but is cautious about such figures as it generates. 
The main task of this study is even riskier than most, since it 
involves producing estimates of numbers of jobs affected by the 
plan ..•• It is not the purpose to create predictions or even esti-
mates, in the strictest sense of the word ..•. The matter cannot be 
one of simply projecting past occurrences into the future, al-
though in some cases this has been done in the study as the only 
feasible means of arriving at estimates. Those estimates of jobs 
that have been derived in this study are not to be taken as pre-
dictions, but simply as indications of the magnitude of possible 
impacts (Mayer, 1976:1). 
The methodology employed in the study is reflected in the section on construction 
employment impacts. The steps involved are: 
1. List and describe Plan policies affecting construction. 
2. Plot the trends of the entire construction industry and 
its sub-categories in the study area. 
3. Project the rate of construction activity into the future 
for each sub-category by providing two or more projections. 
4. Estimate construction jobs lost as well as generated by 
Plan acquisition of developable land. 
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5. Calculate construction jobs lost under the Coastal Com-
mission and use as a proxy for jobs lost under the Plan. 
6. Combine the estimates and summarize the 
With regard to us the past commission as a predictor of the 
plan's impact, they note: 
A comparison of the language of the 1972 Coastal [Zone] Con-
servation Act and the policies of the proposed Coastal Plan 
indicates that the latter is more lenient toward construction, 
or at least no more restrictive than the old one. Therefore, 
it can reasonab be assumed that the quantitative impacts 
of the proposed Coastal Plan will be lesser or no greater 
than those of the present plan (Mayer, 1976:19). 
The analysis of the commission's past effect on the volume of construction 
indicates an awareness of the important theoretical concept of substitutability, 
or "displacement": 
•.. whenever a particular project is denied because of conflict 
with Coastal Plan policies, the same ect or an equivalent 
will be built elsewhere within the Coastal Zone or within the 
region, provided that a substantial demand exists for that proj-
ect. The displacement concept is both an assumption and a 
conclusion. It is an assumption because it is logical and an 
expression of basic supply and demand forces. It is a con-
clusion based on the experience of the past several years. 
For example, the construction trends in Los Angeles, San Diego, 
and San Luis Ob have followed the same pattern as the 
state and national trends for the past six years. Clearly, 
this is not a coincidence, but a solid indication that the 
primary determinant of construction activity is the state of 
the national economy, and the cost of materials, labor, energy 
and money (Mayer, 1976:20). 
Unfortunately, the correlation of trends in the aggregate is in no way a 
"solid indication" that the commission had little effect. Such an assertion 
must rest upon a sophisticated statistical analysis which includes all of the 
determinants of the rate of construction (such as the interest rate on con-
struction loans, construction costs, prices of existing homes, etc.). Regional 
differences in these variables must also be measured and included. Only then 
is it possible to isolate and determine the coastal commission's effect upon 
the volume of construction. 
A rough estimate of the commission's impact on construction within the 
coastal zone is given by its permit denial rate,l8 but this gives no basis for 
determining the "displacement effect." In the final analysis, the reader is 
left to.judge for himself how much of the construction denied is lost forever 
and how much is simp displaced inland or undertaken later. Thus, though the 
study recognizes the displacement effect, no effort is made to estimate it: 
.. it is estimated that the Coastal Plan could 
7,810 construction jobs in San over the next 
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ten years. But for someone who totally rejects the concept 
of displacement and assumes that the Coastal Plan will cause 
the loss of such employment, it is just as easy to say that 
7,810 jobs will be lost (Mayer, 1976:22). 
In using the displacement effect as both assumption and conclusion, the 
missing link is an empirical study which calculates its magnitude. 
9. Governmental Costs and Revenues Associated with Implementing 
Coastal Plan Policies in the Half Moon Bay Subregion, by 
George Goldman and David Strong (September, 1976); and Private 
Sector Economic Impacts Associated with Implementing Coastal 
Plan Policy in the Half Moon Bay Subregion, by George Goldman, 
David Strong, Darryl McLeod, and A. T. Nakazawa (1977). 
These studies detail the private and governmental economic impacts by con-
structing an input-output table and by detailed examination of government agency 
accounts. The input-output table is one of the most sophisticated tools yet 
applied to the analysis of economic impacts in the coastal zone. The Private 
study utilizes the input-output table to estimate the secondary ("responding" or 
multiplier) economic impact of six alternative growth strategies upon six of the 
county's major economic sectors. (The six strategies are based on California 
Coastal Plan policies and local development plans and range from "least restrictive" 
to "most restrictive.") The direct economic impacts are calculated as in most 
other studies by qualified extrapolation of past and present trends. 
The Half Moon Bay input-output model has also been applied to estimate the 
indirect effects of development of the Sea Ranch project. An unpublished master's 
thesis by Bruce Buel at the University of California, Davis, found that total 
buildout of the Sea Ranch project would have a positive fiscal impact on Humboldt 
County and a negative fiscal impact on Mendocino county. 
10. The Cost of Environmental Protection: Regulating Housing 
Development in the Coastal Zone, by DanK. Richardson (1976). 
This study, of the impacts of New Jersey's Coastal Area Facilities Resource 
Act (CAFRA), provides a comparison to California's experience. The act requires 
permits for subdivision developments on the coast. Richardson studies the 
effects of the act by surveying developers on length of delay caused by the per-
mit process, value of construction, size of development, etc. His main con-
clusion is that the cost of delay plus incidental costs of the permitting process 
result is an additional cost of $1,100 for a single-family residence and $750 
for a unit in a multiple-family structure. 
His methodology can be criticized first for determing the total number of 
new developments by relying upon questionnaires to a sample of developers rather 
than upon information from objective sources such as sales data and assessors' 
records. Developers are likely to respond with a bias, while sales data record 
mutually agreeable transactions. Also, the use of a flat-sum estimate for the 
cost of delay obscures the economic nature of the "cost." Costs may not be real 
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losses in housing output or quality; may be simply transfers of wealth from 
developer to consumer. No attempt is made to determine the effect of the housing 
price rise in reducing demand. Furthermore, Richardson's cost estimate is based 
on standard materials costs and final selling price ratios which may be applicable 
to the developments studied. Richardson's results cannot simply be "added on" 
to the price of a house to measure the effect of regulation; they must be quali-
fied and cautiously applied. 
11. The Economic Impact: Land Use and Land Values, by H. E. Frech III 
and Ronald N. Lafferty (1976). 
Using graphical economic analysis, they decompose the coastal commission's 
impact into a "monopoly effect" and an "open space effect" and trace the con-
sequences of each. In addition, they provide the only existing statistical test 
of the coastal commission's effect on property values. Their results indicate 
that: 
... the average increase in the inland residential developed 
sample was actually than the average value increase of 
the coastal zone sample. This difference is s at 
greater than the 99% level. It is far from conclusive, but 
this test then indicates that the residents of the permit 
zone do not gain much benefit from the ion of "nearby 
open space." land in the 
permit zone have from the Coastal 
Commission's restrictions on compet land (Frech and 
Lafferty, 1976:84). 
Furthermore, "the Coastal Commission regulation has ... reduced the value of 
undeveloped land in the permit zone by about 15%" (Frech and Lafferty, 1976:83). 
This relative decrease in value compared to undeveloped non-coastal zone land 
agrees with the coastal commission's de facto guideline of prohibiting develop-
ment on large vacant in undeveloped areas. Frech and Lafferty openly 
qualify their findings by stressing the statistical limitations of using such 
a small sample and urge a study using a large sample of actual sales. 
The theoretical and statistical analysis of this study is the most sophis-
ticated of any yet conducted on the coastal commission. It is logical and com-
plete, and considers effects to which most other studies give but scant attention. 
It is a good example of the application of accepted economic analysis and "state-
of-the-art" statistical methods. 
12. Economic Analysis: California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, by 
the Construction Industry Research Board [CIRB] (1976). 
The CIRB study is more objective than those which calculate the effect upon 
construction directly from the commission's permit denials. It attempts to 
identify the commission's influence from observed data on the coastal economy 
itself. The study uses "location quot compare the tractiveness" of 
coastal sites to inland ones Unfortunat , there 
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are severe methodological difficulties with the CIRB study. First, the concept 
of the "location quotient" does not distinguish between commission-induced 
effects and extraneous ones operating in the coastal zone. The location quotient 
is simply the ratio of coastal zone building activity to coastal zone population, 
divided by the ratio of building activity in the state to the state's population. 
Since population is roughly correlated with building activity, the remaining 
change in each ratio can be ascribed to other factors, such as commission regu-
lation. CIRB's calculations show that the coastal zone ratio has declined 
relative to the state ratio during the period of the commission's regulation. 
This is taken to imply that building has not been as active in the coastal zone 
as inland because of the commission's making the zone less "attractive." This 
is a rather tenuous conclusion, however, since several other factors could 
easily account for the difference in ratios. For example, since the coast has 
always been relatively more attractive as a building site, it is reasonable to 
expect that more of the coast is already built up than are inland areas. The 
location quotient may simply be picking up the spread of suburban areas inland, 
a spread which cannot occur on the coast (obviously) because the ocean stands in 
the way. 
Furthermore, the data in the CIRB study are not data from the coastal zone 
(1,000 yards) itself, but from "coastal cities," which have only part of their 
area in the coastal zone. In fact, the coastal zone is but a minuscule fraction 
of the land area of the cities studied. To the extent that the location quo-
tient is a measure of land use controls (and this is only one of many effects it 
picks up), it measures the effects of zoning controls of the coastal cities as 
well as any effect the commission may have had. As a result of these short-
comings, the findings of the CIRB study must be considered as very rough esti-
mates. 
The Olive Mayer study discussed above provides a much different interpreta-
tion of the same facts: 
The most striking trend in new residential construction ... is 
the shift from coastside to inland. In 1970, 60% of all new 
units were being built in the coastal cities. In 1971, the 
rate shot up to 67% and has declined ever since, until in 1975, 
it was slightly less than half. The decline began in 1972, be-
fore the Coastal [Zone] Conservation Act was passed or imple-
mented, and has continued at a fairly steady rate. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the Act did not start the shift, and 
probably only encouraged it slightly once it had started 
(Mayer, 1976:27). 
Determination of the commission's true effect must await a carefully con-
ducted empirical study using individual parcels as its data base. 
The CIRB study calculated that from 17,802 to 37,730 construction man years 
were lost as a result of the regional commissions' first three years of permit 
decisions (1973-75). When support industries were included, the figures rose to 
equal from 39,459 to 83,608 man years lost (Construction Industry Research Board, 
1976:37). 
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13. the California Coastal Zone, by the 
Environmental and Economic Balance 
This report is basically a summary of data derived from other studies rather 
than in independent empirical effort. It reports on changes in property values 
on the coast: 
... from October 1972, just prior to the passage of Proposition 
20, to April 1975, market prices of existing single family 
homes have increased an average of 41% in the coastal plan-
ning area and 27% in the portions of the coastal counties in-
land from the planning area .... Large parcels of vacant land 
in the coastal planning area, whose future development is 
restricted or uncertain, have dropped sharply in value. In 
Los Angeles County, for example, the drop has been so abrupt 
that the Assessor's Office two years ago found it necessary 
to reduce assessed values on that type of property by as 
much as 40%--and in 1974 made a further cut of as 
much as an additional 25% (California Council, 1976:11-12). 
These figures are for the five-mile strip defined as the planning area, which 
includes only 1,000 yards of land (the permit actually regulated by the 
coastal commission. Changes in value in the remaining portion of the planning 
area are therefore not as much an indication of the coastal commission's restric-
tions as they are a response to expectations concerning future development, future 
expansion of the permit area, and the question of whether there would be a suc-
cessor agency to the coastal commission. 
14. An Economic Interpretation of the California Coastal Commissions, 
by Robert G. Healy (1977). 
While not an empirical study, Healy's contribution is important because it 
identifies the major issues in economic theory applicable to the coastal commission's 
regulation. And it provides a case study analysis of major categories of permits 
with comparisons of denial rates for each category. 
Healy discusses the displacement (or substitution) effect in coastal housing 
markets and notes that the opportunity cost of restricting construction (in terms 
of job loss, for example) depends upon the current level of unemployment. He 
breaks down the effect of a decision on a coastal building permit into two cate-
gories: (1) the decision establishes property rights by either dashing or con-
firming expectations; and (2) the decision specifies exactly how these property 
rights are to be used (i.e., what conditions are placed on the permit approval). 
Overall, Healy analyzes the coastal commissions' performance by the 
criterion of economic efficiency, including unquantifiable as well as measurable 
costs and benefits. 
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D. Summary 
Considered as a group, the studies of the coastal commission above treat the 
major economic issues relevant to the commission's impact. But they lack the 
theoretical underpinning, methodological sophistication, and quality of data base 
which characterize the studies of local land use controls discussed in the first 
section. This can be attributed partly to the recent origin of the commission. 
The shortcomings are also a function of the audience addressed by the re-
ports. Many of them were not intended as definitive statements of the kind one 
finds in academic journals. They were instead preliminary assessments aimed at 
identifying impacts and providing initial estimates based on existing data. 
Some of the studies prepared for the state legislature were performed under 
severe time constraints. 
Though the studies generally do not violate the conclusions of economic 
theory, few of them make explicit reference to it. Instead, the theory is im-
plicit in the framing of the questions and the search for answers. Of all those 
considered, the Frech and Lafferty study (1976) develops the soundest and most 
explicit theoretical base for its empirical work. 
Many of the studies lament the poor quality of available data, yet dis-
aggregated data suitable for analysis does exist. For example, records of in-
dividual real estate sales and descriptions of the property sold are available. 
One obstacle to the use of such data is identifying a subset composed of ob-
servations solely within the 1,000-yard coastal zone. The Yudelson, Mayer, 
CIRB, and CEEB studies did not manage to overcome this difficulty. Only the 
Frech and Lafferty study constructed a data set limited to the 1,000-yard zone. 
Since statistical tests are the most definitive methodologies, the failure 
of the studies reviewed to use them severely limits the reliability of their re-
sults. And since the only statistical tests performed (again, by Frech and 
Lafferty) yielded counter-intuitive results, there is a clear need for further 
extensive statistical research. 
The studies can also be criticized for failing to distinguish short-term 
economic impacts from longer-term ones. Where these effects are distinguished, 
empirical support is not provided. 
Another shortcoming is that the studies often consider only the initial 
economic impacts. Inclusion of the "multiplier" or "re-spending" effects, as 
Parable Beach advises (see note 16), is not considered. One outstanding counter-
example is the Half Moon Bay Private Seetor study, which incorporates these 
effects through the use of an input-output table. 
To provide clear, precise, and statistically valid answers to the questions 
which the studies reviewed address will obviously require additional research. 
Moreover, there are additional issues which have not yet been researched, but 
for which the suitable methodology can be designed. Detailed suggestions for 
performing research in both of these categories are made in the following 
section. 
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v 
RESEARCH NEEDS 
The deficiencies of the existing studies of the economic impacts of the 
coastal commission, coupled with the sheer magnitude of the economic values 
affected, argue that research continue--and at a more sophisticated level. 
Despite the volume of research which has been performed, there is very little 
evidence to support any particular hypothesis concerning the commission's im-
pact. The greatest need, therefore, is for statistical verification of such 
alternative hypotheses, using current methodology and the most disaggregated 
data available. The research recommended below is primarily of this type. 
To establish research priorities and evaluate the feasibility of each proj-
ect, the following criteria are applied: 
l. Importance of each project in terms of economic magnitudes involved; 
necessity of answering some questions before others; urgency of the 
issue(s) investigated (with respect to 1 slative action, imminence 
of irreversible development, etc.). 
2. Cost of the project. 
3. Quality and availability of data. If data is generated by the study 
itself, what is the cost for data of appropriate quality? 
4. Applicability of current methodology to the subject, or feasibility 
of designing innovative methodology. 
FIRST PRIORITY: COMMISSION'S EFFECT UPON SINGLE-FAMILY DWELLING PRICE 
AND CONSTRUCTION RATE 
The most important issue unresolved by the studies reviewed in the previous 
chapter is the strength of the "displacement" or "substitution" effect in the 
coastal real estate market in the wake of the coastal commission's permit 
review decisions. The central issue is whether the commission's impact has 
been to decrease construction absolutely or to transfer it inland. This 
question is related to the national controversy over "growth controls": Do they 
diminish growth absolutely, or simply displace it to an area without controls? 
There are really two separate but related questions involved in the "displacement 
effect": 
(1) Have property values in the coastal zone changed because of the coastal 
commission's assumed restrictions, and have these price changes 
caused buyers to subs itute inland property for coastal zone property, 
thus altering the structure of prices inland? 
(2) Has the presumed difficulty coastal commission 
of induced to choose alternate sites inland 
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Research is presently being conducted by the author toward a Ph.D. dis-
sertation at the University of California, Riverside, to determine the magni-
tude and statistical significance of these two effects. In answering the first 
question, the data base utilized is the complete record of single-family dwelling 
sales transacted through the Multiple Listing Service during 1969-76 in the 
coastal zone and adjacent areas of Los Angeles and Ventura counties. The set 
contains data on more than 450,000 sales. The data include not only sale price, 
but an exhaustive listing of structural characteristics of the residences 
studied as well. Characteristics include square footage of living area; number 
of bedrooms, bathrooms, and other rooms; number of stories; age; condition; and 
many other particulars. Lot size is also included. Distance from the coast and 
the median income of the census tract in which each parcel is situated are 
measured independently and included as measures of neighborhood quality. 
Use of a detailed description of each property sold is essential. Previous 
comparisons of house prices between the coastal zone and inland have 
differences in housing quality (size, condition, age, etc.) in the two areas. 
This study, in effect, standardizes housing quality the current statis-
tical methodology known as "hedonic prices." Valid in house prices 
between the two areas can then be made. 
A monthly time series of hedonic prices for each significant house character-
istic is constructed. Thisseries is then correlated with several time series 
of relevant economic variables affecting the coastal hous market, such as the 
rate of interest on construction loans, mortgage interest rates, personal in-
come, and the existence of the coastal commission. This technique separates and 
quantifies the various influences on the housing market and provides the first 
comprehensive and statistically valid test of the commission's effect on house 
prices. Furthermore, the strength of the displacement effect can be determined 
by following changes in the time path of house (characteristics) prices in the 
coastal zone and inland. 
The second aspect of the displacement effect--concerning developers' loca-
tional decisions--is inves by the level o bui act 
over time with the various time series of economic indicators mentioned above 
by employing multiple linear regression analysis. The data base used is the 
record of individual building permits both within the coastal zone and inland. 
Since this is the first statistical test of the displacement effect in 
construction, it should help settle some issues concerning the presumed decline 
in coastal housing construction and loss of construction jobs. re-
sults on both of these displacement effects are expected in late 1978. 
SECOND PRIORITY: COMMISSION'S EFFECT UPON NEW SINGLE- AND MULTI-FAMILY 
DWELLINGS 
Since the bulk of new homes are sold by the rather than through 
the Multiple Listing Service, are not included in the author's It 
is important to examine new homes as distinct from ones because here 
the coastal commission's effect is expected to be most marked, since it was 
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new-home permits that were decided upon. Data collection may present a problem, 
since there exists no centralized data source for new homes as there does for 
existing ones. Assessors' records and local building permits are the only 
available sources of this information. 
Since a prime concern of the coastal commission is regulation of the den-
sity of coastal development, multiple-family dwellings have come under close 
scrutiny. Examination of the detailed denial recordl9 shows that most of the 
permits denied were for multiple-unit dwellings, so that one would expect the 
coastal commission's influence on multiple-unit prices and construction rates 
to be strong. An additional reason for studying multiple-unit dwelling con-
struction is that its value is greater than the value of single-family dwellings. 
This type of data can be obtained from independent realtors and from building 
permit authorities. 
The major costs for these studies are data collection and computer pro-
cessing, since the methodology has already been developed in the author's study. 
Results of these studies would include the displacement effect for new 
homes and multi-unit dwellings. Hence would provide additional evidence 
to the debate over the true impact of land use controls. 
THIRD PRIORITY: MEASUREMENT OF BEACH ACCESS AND VALUE OF BEACH VISITATION 
Maintaining public access to beaches was a key issue in the debate over 
Proposition 20. Some commentators have even pointed to this issue as the 
deciding factor in Proposition 20's passage. In addition to being politically 
important, beach access has considerable economic value--to beachgoers them-
selves and to beachgoer-dependent businesses. Since no admission fee is 
charged at most beaches, and since beach access is a "public good" (provided 
whether few or many consume it), there is no ready measure of its economic 
value; it would be desirable to conduct a study to determine how much beachgoers 
would be willing to pay for that experience. Among other things, the results 
of such a study would indicate the economic value of expanded beach access. 
McConnell (1977) has performed such a study on several Rhode Island beaches. 
Beachgoers on beaches of varying quality and levels of congestion were asked 
about their willingness to pay for the visitation privilege. Multiple regression 
analysis was then applied to this data to determine the public's valuation of 
beach characteristics such as temperature and congestion. A similar study could 
easily be performed for California beaches, using the same methodology. The 
costs would be modest, and would include professional consulting, interviewers, 
and computer time. 
Another, and perhaps more basic question is also worthy of research: To 
what extent has beach access actually changed over the recent past? Additionally, 
was it indeed true that development along the coast prior to Proposition 20 had 
created a "Chinese Wall" preventing public penetration? And how much increased 
beach access can be attributed to the coastal commission? 
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Recent reports in the popular press20 have indicated that although access-
ways have been dedicated, they are still not in operation. A further aim of 
the study would thus be to identify obstacles to increased access both with and 
without prior dedication and to suggest alternative means for overcoming these 
obstacles. 
Several approaches to measuring beach access over the recent past are 
available: 
(1) Measure past beach visitation by (a) compiling existing records of 
past attendance counts (one source is the California State Department 
of Parks and Recreation); and (b) photo-interpreting past aerial 
photographs taken from high-flying aircraft (information to be 
gleaned includes traffic flow, parked vehicles, and body count). 
The success of this approach depends on how complete and accurate 
the past records and photo-surveys are. A program which collects 
this type of data for present beach visitation would be more certain 
of obtaining high quality data. 
(2) Measure past access by locating access points. Aerial photo-inter-
pretation would be employed to identi these points. Land ownership 
records would then be inspected to determine whether the land was 
publicly or privately held in order to ascertain rights of entry. 
(3) Measure the past trend of beachgoer-dependent commerical activity. 
The object is to determine the relative visitation levels among 
various beaches over time. 
(4) Examine the record of coastal commission permit decisions to determine 
which have enhanced or limited beach access. 
The cost of performing each alternative project is likely to vary sub-
stantially with the quality and availability of past data or the ease of 
generating current data. 
FOURTH PRIORITY: COASTAL COMMISSION DATA COLLECTION SYSTEM 
In their contribution to the Review of the California Coastal Plan, ICF 
Associates made the following suggestion: 
The California Coastal Plan, if implemented, will be unique in 
the nation, and as it progresses it will be continually break-
ing new ground. (For this reason, it may be appropriate to 
consider the establishment of an ongoing evaluation, monitor-
ing and reporting process so that lessons learned from this 
experience are not lost.) (ICF:32) 
Therefore it may be useful to design a more comprehensive and accurate 
data collection system for measuring coastal zone management impacts. Possible 
features include: (1) a detailed ion of each coastal t 
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including value of land and structure, delay, and modifications; and (2) deter-
mination of issues involved in the approval or denial of each permit considered 
for public hearing. 
A detailed, month-by-month picture of the commission's decisions would 
then be available to correlate with real estate price changes, rates of new 
construction, etc. Such a system would also be of value to political scientists 
studying the commission's decisionmaking process. 
The initial application of the system could be to the past record of the 
California Coastal Commission. (A preliminary effort to record and categorize 
features of each permit was begun in the South Coast region, but was not 
followed through.21) An ongoing system could then be set up in conjunction 
with the record-keeping activities of the present coastal commissions. If 
successful, the system could be applied, with appropriate modifications, to 
the coastal zone management programs of other states. 
The feasibility of such a project is demonstrated by the initial efforts of 
the researchers who have studied the permit decision record. Though the cost 
may be substantial, the benefits, in terms of more precise assessment of Coastal 
Zone Management Act implementation, should not be overlooked. Additionally, 
much of the uncertainty and confusion stemming from the lack of explicit guide-
lines under the coastal commission could have been eliminated if a properly 
summarized record of permit decisions were available. 
FIFTH PRIORITY: COMMISSION'S EFFECT UPON THE AVAILABILITY OF LOW- AND 
MODERATE-INCOME HOUSING IN THE COASTAL ZONE 
Maintaining the availability of low- and moderate-income housing was a 
de facto guideline of some of the regional commissions, but it is not known 
to what extent this goal was realized in practice. A related guideline was 
the preservation of unique coastal neighborhoods, some of which were low- and 
moderate-income in character. Low- and moderate-income housing in the coastal 
zone has also been an important political issue. It was voiced in the testimony 
of consumer activist groups at commission hearings. The initial 1976 coastal 
bill was defeated in committee because of the lack of effective provisions 
for insuring low- and moderate-income families access to coastal housing and to 
the beach for recreational purposes. 
Furthermore, it has been asserted that the commission has induced price 
increases in coastal housing such that these families have been priced out of 
the market. While the commission's price effects are being investigated by the 
author (see First Priority, above), the current income composition of coastal 
households remains unresearched. 
A study is needed to examine target neighborhoods, using data available 
from the county assessor's office, the real estate Multiple Listing Service, and 
building permit issuing authorities. Property and structure values can be traced 
over the period of the commission's regulation in order to be correlated with 
household income. (Data on household income and other economic and demographic 
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characteristics would be obtained by survey and compared with U.S. and local 
census data.) Special attention would be given to permit decisions in the 
target and surrounding areas as indicators of neighborhood change, change in 
tenure type, and change in property and structure values. Statistical tests to 
determine the magnitude and significance of various effects would be performed. 
Costs of the research would include professional consulting, interviewing, 
data compilation, and computer time. Cost is estimated to fall within the range 
of many small- to medium-size projects. 
SIXTH PRIORITY: ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE COASTAL ZONE 
The shortcomings and conflicting interpretations of many of the studies 
discussed above stem from poor quality data. Construction of time series of 
important economic indicators in the coastal zone would help resolve some of 
these problems. Furthermore, a continuing monitoring system would aid policy-
makers and implementers by giving them more rapid feedback and identifying areas 
in need of policy change. 
A program which accomplishes the following tasks would provide the relevant 
information: 
Construct the recent economic history of the coastal zone and ad-
jacent inland areas. Correlate economic variables with social, 
market, and government trends and events. Trends to be con-
structed include: (1) rate of construction (from building permit 
data); (2) real estate sales volume, housing stock, dwelling and 
land prices; (3) air quality; (4) beach visitation; (5) transpor-
tation capacity and use; (6) personal income and its distribution; 
and (7) demographic characteristics. 
A major benefit of such a research effort is to make clear the changing 
pattern of the coastal economy in its important dimensions. This is essential 
to the success of more specialized empirical studies because it establishes a 
"baseline" by which to compare the results of these studies. 
Portions of such data have already been compiled by the Research Department 
of Security Pacific Bank from census data, real estate market data, and other 
sources. 
SEVENTH PRIORITY: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DELAY IN THE COMMISSION'S 
PERMITTING PROCEDURE 
Though several studies exist of the costs of delay due to review by land 
use control authorities, their results vary widely. Furthermore, no study ex-
ists which examines the costs of delay according to the following two criteria: 
(1) a loss in real output to the economy, and (2) a transfer of wealth and in-
come between economic agents and groups. This constitutes a serious deficiency 
in the literature on the economic impacts of land use controls. From the 
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perspective of economic analysis, the above criteria represent the distinction 
between a loss in efficiency and a redistribution of value, a central distinc-
tion in applied and theoretical research. 
Categories of cost delay which the study would investigate include: (1) land 
holding costs, (2) interest charges, (3) inflation in land and construction, and 
(4) forgone economic opportunities. 
Though the costs of delay have been the object of past research, no serious 
study of the benefits of delay exists. Benefits are likely to receive less 
attention because they are, for the most part, non-monetary. They are also 
frequently long term and diffused over the entire population. Examples are 
preservation of coastal air quality and siting of potentially dangerous facil-
ities in remote areas. 
Benefits of delay include (but are not limited to) the following categories: 
(1) increased public participation in decisionmaking; (2) adequate time for 
information gathering before decisions are made; and (3) better project design 
and integration into existing development. 
The methodology best suited to such research is a series of properly 
chosen case studies. Since detailed descriptions exist of many of the projects 
reviewed by public hearing at the San Diego and South Coast regional commissions, 
research could profitably begin there. Interviews with commission staff and 
commissioners would yield additional clarification. The costs of delay are 
calculable from proper interpretation of readily available economic indicators 
such as the rate of interest on construction loans and the rate of profit in 
construction. 
Categories of expense entailed in perfoming the study include professional 
consulting, interviewing, and data collection. Cost range is estimated to be 
that of the usual small-to-moderate-size study. 
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NOTES 
1. For a discussion of the economic issues involved see Rettig (1974). 
2. A term coined by Bosselman and Callies (1971). 
3. A larger literature exists on the economics of land use controls in general 
than on the specific controls which have been applied in coastal zone 
management programs. However, because of the unique features of the coastal 
zone and the complex interplay of economic forces upon it from a variety of 
sectors in the economy, conclusions drawn from research on the economic im-
pact of land use controls in general may not be applicable. For example, 
municipalities frequently separate industrial uses from residential ones 
and concentrate them in appropriately defined areas. The "agglomeration 
economies" thus achieved lower costs and may make this type of land use con-
trol viable. But in the narrow coastal zone, land use controls which pre-
serve viewshed, public access to beaches, and open space may leave so little 
land for industrial uses that industries cannot congregate there, even if 
specific areas are set aside. Hence the agglomeration economies in such 
limited coastal industrial areas may be ins ficant. Consequently, the 
land use control strategy which produced good results inland may be a poor 
choice for the coast. 
4. For a discussion of the externality rationale for zoning see Mandelker 
(1971:23-27). Hirsch (1972:419-24) gives a standard textbook treatment of 
the rationale for zoning. 
5. A discussion of the testing of this hypothesis by various authors is pre-
sented in ch. 3 of this study, under "ExtPrnal ity Zoning and the Reduction 
in Market Efficiency." 
6. For an early recognition of this difficulty, see Coase (1960). 
7. For a more detailed (though quite readable) discussion of this effect see 
Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese (1973). 
8. For a discussion of the fiscal impacts of unregulated land development see 
Muller (1975). 
9. For a description of one such scheme see Hagman (1974). 
10. For a treatment of the economic impact of development (other than the 
retarding of development through land use controls used as growth controls) 
see Schaenman and Muller (1974:44-55). 
11. Robert G. Healy, An Economic Interpretation of the California Coastal 
Commission (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation, 1977). 
12. Two general discussions of the distributional effects of growth controls 
and environmentally oriented land use controls, respectively, are Franklin 
(1973) and Babcock and Callies (1973). 
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13. Quoted in Healy (1976:187) from Bergman et al. (1974:196). 
14. Quoted in Healy (1976:187) from Peterson (1974). 
15. See Construction Industry Research Board (1975 and 1976), as well as 
Richardson (1976). 
16. One of the most valuable related studies is a new book which provides a 
sound methodological basis from which to evaluate coastal zone management: 
Parable Beach: A Pr.imer in Coastal Zone Economics, by J. W. Devanney III, 
G. Ashe, and B. Parkhurst (1976). It is basically a guide to the analysis 
of economic impacts of alternative coastal zone management projects, util-
izing current methodological tools. In style it is a heuristic account of 
a hypothetical coastal zone management experience utilizing realistic data, 
but is not itself an empirical case study. Parable Beach is useful, as its 
title implies, in teaching coastal policymakers and implementers how to 
go about evaluating alternative projects and studying the economic impacts 
of their decisions. 
Parable Beach begins by discussing several concepts which are frequently 
only vaguely understood and which therefore lead to mismanagement of the 
coast: 
(1) Real municipal income--Devanney et al. define this as the total income, 
adjusted for inflation, which the town's inhabitants receive. It is dis-
tinctly separate from any consideration of the distribution of income in 
the town. This distinction is in keeping with standard economic analysis, 
which decomposes economic changes into changes in total magnitude and in 
distribution, and which regards questions of income distribution as ethical 
rather than scientific problems. 
(2) The black box concept--In order to analyze impacts consistently, it is 
necessary to demarcate the geographical boundaries of the town being con-
sidered. Only then is it possible to make statements about the impact on 
the town itself. 
(3) Market prices as a measure of value--It is noted that many coastal re-
sources are not priced by the market, but those which are tend to have 
prices which reflect in some rough way consumers' willingness to pay. Also, 
these prices are usually fixed for the smaller units of local government 
and cannot be altered by them. 
(4) Present value and the choice of an interest rate--The time pattern of 
the flow of income to the municipality is important to its welfare: a 
dollar ten years hence is not as desirable as a dollar today. How much 
less desirable the future dollar will be depends on the interest rate over 
the future. The economic analysis in Parable Beach considers alternatives 
which differ according to plausible values of the interest rate. 
(5) Net economic effect--When considering alternative uses of a particular 
coastal resource, the crucial economic policy variable is the net economic 
effect. That is, the difference between the economic impacts of various 
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projects is what is important. This difference depends critically upon the 
alternative opportunities for using the coastal resources in question. 
When coastal agricultural land is converted to residential use, the net 
effect on, say, employment, is the construction and continuing maintenance 
jobs created minus whatever jobs are lost by the cessation of agriculture. 
(Of course, if the agriculture is moved inland, the loss to society is not 
as great as it is to the municipality itself.) 
Another important reason for using the net economic effect rather than a 
gross effect is to estimate accurately the "re-spending" or "multiplier" 
effect. Without the proper base impact to begin these calculations, errors 
from estimation of the base impact become multiplied. 
Devanney et al. go on to suggest a framework for analysis of the economic 
impacts of proposed projects, a framework to guide coastal zone management 
policymakers in a before-the-fact assessment. 
(1) The construction of a set of accounts--This must be done in order to 
avoid "double-counting," that is, including an economic impact more than 
once in the calculation of the net effect. The set of accounts should also 
be constructed so that no income changes are excluded. A separate account 
is constructed for each group involved: municipal government, consumers, 
industry, commerce, etc. The choice of accounting method will depend on 
the alternative projects (including present or "no" use) used for comparison 
and the type of municipality involved. 
(2) The choice of a baseline--Here "baseline" means "the situation against 
which changes are measured" (Devanney et al., 1976:29). In order to properly 
compare alternative projects, the baseline must be consistent--the same one 
must be applied to each alternative. (This may not happen when proponents 
of alternative projects present independent analyses.) 
(3) Calculation of "re-spending" or "multiplier" effects--The net difference 
in income created by alternative projects, compared with the baseline, is 
only the direct initial economic impact. When that income is re-spent 
further economic activity is generated. This effect must be added to tl1e 
initial direct effect. Various assumptions about the size and variation of 
the multiplier or re-spending effect can be made, based on knowledge of the 
situation at hand. This is the final step in a thorough and consistent 
calculation of a project's economic impact. 
17. For the opposite view, see Russell and Kneese (1973), especially p. 50. 
18. See Rosentraub and Warren (1974) and Rosentraub, Warren, and Gould (1975). 
These studies utilize the South Coast Regional Commission's permit decision 
record to construct numerous statistical tables. The tables categorize 
permit decisions by location, building type, value, and many other variables. 
Though the use of the data is exhaustive, there are some flaws in the treat-
ment overall: (1) Though permit data is disaggregated into separate groups 
for permits on the consent calendar and those scheduled for public hearing, 
only a sample, rather than the full population, was analyzed. Given the 
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variation in permit characteristics, significant relationships may not be 
revealed from such a sample. (2) Subsequent approvals of denied permits 
were not included. For a more up-to-date computation of the aggregate 
denial rates see South Coast Regional Commission (1977). 
19. See South Coast Regional Commission (1977). 
20. Sweeney (1977:4). 
21. See note 18 for a description of this previous study. 
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